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NOTES
A  SOLDIER’S-EYE  VIEW  OF  THE  HOMEFRONT:
EXAMINING  DOMESTIC  MILITARY  LAWS
THROUGH  THE  LENS  OF  MILITARY DOCTRINE
Joseph Florczak*
INTRODUCTION
The military’s domestic law enforcement role creates intense
debate over United States law and policy.  Some scholars argue for
only limited use and strict control over domestic use of force and mili-
tary law enforcement, arguing that such usage impinges upon impor-
tant civil rights and carries too high a risk of tragedy or abuse.1  They
propose substantial checks on this executive power similar to those
present upon civilian law enforcement agencies.2  In the opposing
camp, commentators argue that abstract concerns over civil rights fail
to respond to real-world emergencies and threats.3  They point to nat-
ural disasters and looming terrorist threats as situations ill-suited to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2013.  This
Note is dedicated to the memory of my father, Joseph D. Florczak, always the role
model and mentor.  I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski for his guidance,
Bryan Bond and Spencer Durland for their outstanding editing support, and the
entire Notre Dame Law Review staff for their suggestions and hard work.  I give special
thanks for the support of my wife and best friend, Mary Megan, her family, and my
mother, Dr. Kristine Florczak.  To all the soldiers I served beside in the United States
Army and the Illinois Army National Guard, it has been the honor of a lifetime.
1 See, e.g., Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil
Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 439 (2003) (discussing the checkered
history of domestic martial law, inadequate military training for law enforcement
tasks, and military threats to individual liberties).
2 See, e.g., Miriam Schneider, Military Spying in the United States: When It Is Not Your
Neighbor Knocking at Your Door, Where Do You Turn?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 199,
231 (2005) (advocating for the application of warrants to domestic military surveil-
lance under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court structure).
3 See John R. Brinkerhoff, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforce-
ment, JOINT CENTER FOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED Q. BULL., Dec.
2191
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burdensome safeguards.4  Often these arguments call for lifting
restrictions on the executive branch to enable both rapid action and
full application of military capability to meet exigent circumstances.5
Likewise, commentators debate over the desired means of domes-
tic military control.  Some insist that careful and clear language from
Congress will serve as the best safeguard.6  A few voices in the debate
discuss the role of state authority on the issue.7  Others insist that judi-
cial restrictions are the most appropriate.8
These debates lack substantial reflection on how these various
compromises translate into successful execution of these policy goals.
The ideas governing the military forces are more fluid than the forces
themselves.  Successful military operations almost always adhere to
classic “doctrinal” military principles—principles that often determine
whether the military aims can be achieved, as distinguished from
whether the aims should be achieved.9
2004, at 23 (“The real effect of the Posse Comitatus Act has been to slow down the
response time for the use of federal troops.”).
4 See Jessica DeBianchi, Note, Military Law: Winds of Change—Examining the Pre-
sent-Day Propriety of the Posse Comitatus Act After Hurricane Katrina, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 473, 509 (2006) (calling for amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act to “clear
away the political debris” from military intervention after a natural disaster); John B.
Longley III, Note, Military Purpose Act: An Alternative to the Posse Comitatus Act—Accom-
plishing Congress’s Intent with Clear Statutory Language, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 719 (2007)
(asserting that confusion over current law “prevent[s] our leaders from taking clear
and decisive actions when necessary to protect American lives” and highlighting
domestic terrorism, border security, and the Hurricane Katrina response as circum-
stances that necessitate protection).
5 See Candidus Dougherty, “Neccessity Hath No Law”: Executive Power and the
Posse Comitatus Act, 51–52 (March 2008) (unpublished article) (on file with Rutgers
University), available at http://works.bepress.com/candidus_dougherty/2 (arguing
that the Posse Comitatus Act was intended to restrict civilian law enforcement officers
and not the President).  Much commentary maintains that restrictions on domestic
military use are self-imposed or result from legal misunderstanding.
6 See Longley, supra note 4, at 718. R
7 See Ashley J. Craw, Note, A Call to Arms: Civil Disorder Following Hurricane Katrina
Warrants Attack on the Posse Comitatus Act, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 829, 855–65 (2007)
(discussing a “Natural Disaster Act” that would authorize federal military law enforce-
ment after a natural disaster at the request of a state governor and analyzing that the
law’s interaction with military doctrine confirms a variation of this principle is likely
the best compromise).
8 See Sean McGrane, Note, Katrina, Federalism, and Military Law Enforcement: A
New Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1332–39 (2010)
(describing a proposed “PCA Court” that would issue warrants to allow domestic mili-
tary law enforcement in case-by-case situations).
9 HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 3-0 OPERATIONS, A-1 (2008) [here-
inafter FM 3-0] (“The nine principles of war represent the most important nonphysi-
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This Note aims to explore this gap in the current discussion.  It
seeks to illustrate what “right” looks like in protecting individual liber-
ties alongside the common welfare.  It evaluates the current alignment
of laws and policies against principles of military doctrine and deter-
mines how well they work together to facilitate success.  Finally, it pro-
poses that use of state-federal controls on domestic military use, along
with some limitations on the existing federal role, would strike a bet-
ter balance than the current and proposed federal-only controls.
Part I of this Note begins by defining what “right” looks like in
finding a proper balance between protecting individual liberties from
military incursion and protecting the common security by maximizing
military options.  Part II examines the instruments of that social policy
and will highlight important differences in the capability and domes-
tic authority of U.S. federal and state military forces.10  It will also
introduce the doctrinal principles critical to their ability to succeed.
Part III evaluates whether current federal laws implement sound pol-
icy and whether they facilitate doctrinally-sound military operations.
Part IV explores some alternate views, proposed changes to federal
laws, and how successfully they balance social policy and enable mili-
tary success.  Part V concludes that state-federal controls and some
federal limitation might bring about the best three-way balance
between liberty, common welfare, and military success.
I. BALANCING LIBERTY AND SECURITY INTERESTS:
WHAT RIGHT LOOKS LIKE
Commentator debates over the military’s proper domestic role
fracture along lines similar to debates on traditional law enforcement
functions.  The essential arguments contrast individual liberty with
collective security, and various commentators place differing norma-
tive value on each.11  Though the requirements of each can be at
odds, common ground can be found between them.
cal factors that affect the conduct of operations. . . . [T]hey summarize characteristics
of successful operations.”).
10 National Guard forces are the state-controlled forces addressed by this Note.
Part II.A explores their dual state and federal roles in greater depth.
11 Compare Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle
In Need of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 953, 984 (1997)  (arguing that expansion of the
military role in “‘the war’ on drugs” is a “danger[ ] to our individual rights and to the
. . . underlying structure of the United States”), with Steven L. Miller, The Military,
Domestic Law Enforcement, and Posse Comitatus: A Time for Change, 29–30 (Apr.
2000) (unpublished research report) (on file with the Air War College), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=x
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Recent history provides illustrative examples of the domestic mili-
tary playing the role of both hero and villain.  The military might
readily abuse individual civil rights by using excessive lethal force,
interfering with freedoms of expression or assembly, or conducting
unmonitored, intrusive surveillance.  Moreover, combined military
and law-enforcement training may “leak” these undesired attributes
into the organizations focused on routine law enforcement.  Never-
theless, the military has superior capabilities to address certain types
of emergencies and incidents.  Suppressing insurrection, enforcing
federal law in the face of state opposition, restoring order to cities
torn by man and nature, and countering criminal use of military tech-
nology are tasks where no other government agency can respond as
rapidly and effectively.  A proper balance depends upon preventing
unwanted abuses without crippling needed capabilities.
A. Civil Rights Concerns
1. Military Use of Lethal Force
One of the most obvious risks in domestic military interventions
is that of excessive lethal force.  Military formations are built to inflict
maximum lethal force in the shortest time possible.12  The prospect of
sudden, violent, and summary execution is directly at odds with consti-
tutional guarantees of due process.13  Such incidents damage govern-
ment credibility and leave lasting impressions on the public.14  The
Kent State Massacre grimly illustrates this danger.15  In that 1970 inci-
dent, Ohio National Guard troops shot and killed a number of
unarmed college students while responding to campus protests
against the Vietnam War.16  In 1993, military armored vehicles
breached and rubbled the Branch Davidian compound in Waco,
ADA393971 (urging expanded military participation in anti-drug interdiction and cit-
ing the need to combat the problem with multiple agencies).
12 See FM 3-0, supra note 9, at 4-1 (discussing the definition of combat power to R
include “the total means of destructive . . . capabilities that a military unit/formation
can apply at a given time”).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[No person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law.”).
14 See Sam Howe Verhovek, 5 Years After Waco Standoff, the Spirit of Koresh Lingers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at 1 (describing lingering effects on the Waco community
following the siege and deaths at the Branch Davidian compound); see also infra notes
15–16 and accompanying text (describing other domestic military incidents). R
15 See Gary Tuchman, Kent State Forever Linked with Vietnam War Era, CNN (May 4,
2000, 1:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/views/y/2000/04/tuchman.kent
state.may4.
16 See id.
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Texas while acting under the direction of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).17  The ensuing fire and violent chaos
killed numerous men, women, and children.18  These deaths occurred
without the intense due process that accompanies ordinary use of the
death penalty.19
Amplifying this danger, such lethal force may arise because of the
fundamental mismatch in the organization and training between the
military and law enforcement.  An anecdotal example illustrates the
point: during the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, Marines escorted a police
officer to the scene of a domestic disturbance.20  After someone in the
house shot at them, the officer called for the Marines to “cover him”
as he approached the house.21  In law enforcement training, “to
cover” is to point a weapon towards an area and to fire if necessary.22
In Marine Corps training, “to cover” is to saturate an enemy position
with a large amount of gunfire to prevent accurate enemy return
fire.23  The Marines “covered” the officer according to the latter defi-
nition, firing nearly 200 bullets into the house before the police
officer could stop them.24  Though no injuries resulted, the dangers
of miscommunication in such an environment are obvious.25
2. Military Intrusion on Individual Civil Liberties
Both intentional and incidental suppression of the freedoms of
speech and assembly by the military are concerns.  Freedom from
such assertions of governmental power was a core concern of the Con-
stitution’s framers, and these concerns continue to be relevant.26  The
17 See JOHN C. DANFORTH, FINAL REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL CON-
CERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE MT. CARMEL COMPLEX WACO, TX 139,
155–63 (2000) [hereinafter DANFORTH REPORT] (describing armored vehicle support
to FBI and ATF agents and their use in assault and breaching of the Branch Davidian
compound).
18 See Verhovek, supra note 14, at 1. R
19 See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, DEATH ROW FACT SHEET (2011), available
at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/ (“14.12 years is the average number of
years between offense and execution.”).





25 See id.  It was later discovered that the suspect’s children were in the targeted
house.
26  See Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106–09 (2003) (describing early U.S. mistrust
of standing military forces).
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internment of Japanese and Japanese-American citizens during the
Second World War aptly illustrates the dangers of routine domestic
military law enforcement.27  Military restrictions escalated from
nightly registrations and curfews to forcible relocation of families
based merely on the threat of military sabotage.28
The Reconstruction period following the American Civil War
illustrates the danger of incidental rights suppression by a constant
military law enforcement presence.29  Tensions over the South’s mili-
tary occupation peaked when federal troops protected presidential
polling sites, and the perceived effect on voters in a close presidential
election angered citizens.30  More recently, President Bush considered
using military members to arrest members of a suspected terrorist cell,
and raised the possibility of abuse to politically unpopular, vulnerable
groups.31
Hidden or covert military presence may endanger civil liberties as
much as an oppressive, overt presence.  Law enforcement agencies
focus on gathering evidence for use in later judicial actions.  Military
intelligence assets focus on gathering relevant information as com-
pletely as possible for operational use.32  Military electronic eavesdrop-
ping and other surveillance devices can intrude substantially into
civilian privacy and constitute unreasonable searches and seizures.33
Recent incidents highlight these risks.  In 2002, the Secretary of
Defense authorized domestic military electronic surveillance to assist
27 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 291 (1944) (describing the forcible resettle-
ment of Japanese citizens to centralized internment camps); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–18 (1944) (describing the military-ordered exclusion of
same persons from “Military Areas” despite having permanent domicile there); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88–89 (1943) (describing curfew restrictions on
persons of Japanese, German, and Italian ancestry).
28 See supra note 27. R
29 See Canestaro, supra note 26, at 111–14 (discussing military rule during Recon- R
struction and tensions therein).
30 See id.
31 See Mark Mazzetti & David Johnston, Bush Weighed Using Military in U.S. Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A1, A3 (examining high-level decision making about pos-
sible authority to use the military to facilitate domestic arrests in counter-terrorism
settings); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (offering evidence that the civil R
rights of groups forming a perceived national security threat are more easily violated).
32 See FM 3-0, supra note 9, at 4-3 (observing that “information has become as R
important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations” and discussing
the critical role information plays in shaping stability operations).
33 See generally HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 381-10:
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (discussing military authorization to conduct elec-
tronic eavesdropping, physical searches, and surveillance of non-U.S. persons abroad
without warrants).
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in the capture of the “D.C. sniper,”34 and controversy ensued after
military intelligence agents questioned members of an Islamic law
symposium at the University of Texas.35  Court reluctance to impose
an “exclusionary rule” on evidence gathered by unauthorized military
participation in law enforcement exacerbates the concerns.36
3. Military Influence on Law Enforcement
Military threats to civil liberties do not come solely from military
forces.  Such threats can exist where the military merely extends influ-
ence.37  Close cooperation and shared training between military and
law enforcement members can result in undesired military attributes
crossing over to law enforcement agents.38  For example, police
S.W.A.T. teams are often composed of former military members, carry
weaponry and protective gear similar to military forces, and employ
variations of military tactics.39  Though some of these techniques may
be necessary to deal with certain dangerous or violent criminals, crea-
tion of such a “para-military” organization may undermine the Ameri-
34 See Barbara Starr, Rumsfeld OKs Military Assist in Sniper Hunt, CNN (Oct. 15,
2002, 6:50 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-10-15/us/sniper.pentagon_1_sniper-
hunt-law-enforcement-posse-comitatus-act?_s=PM:US.
35 See Press Release, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Pressed by
ADC, US Army Concludes Special Agents Exceeded Authority at UT Austin (Nov. 21,
2011), available at http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=2174.
36 The appropriateness of such an exclusionary rule is a point of contention.
Compare Canestaro, supra note 26, at 143 (“The judiciary, demonstrating their tradi- R
tional deference to military activity, has undermined efforts to broaden the prohibi-
tions of the [Posse Comitatus Act] by including an exclusionary power.”), with Major
Saviano, Note, The Exclusionary Rule’s Applicability to Violations of the Posse Comitatus Act,
ARMY LAW. July 1995, at 61 (1995) (predicting courts will only apply the exclusionary
rule to widespread or egregious violations of the Posse Comitatus Act).
37 Some commentators extend this danger to veteran participation in law
enforcement.  See Raj Dhanasekaran, When Rotten Apples Return: How the Posse Comita-
tus Act of 1878 Can Deter Domestic Law Enforcement Authorities from Using Military Interro-
gation Techniques on Civilians, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 233, 233 (2005) (citing hazards
from Iraq war veterans importing “torture” techniques into domestic law
enforcement).
38 See David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco
Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619,
646–52 (1997) (describing the militarization of law enforcement at the federal, state,
and local levels).
39 See LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, S.W.A.T. SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS, http:/
/www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/848 (last visited Mar. 7,
2012) (describing initial formation of L.A.P.D. S.W.A.T. from former military mem-
bers and their shared training with elite international special operations forces).
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can civil law enforcement tradition.40  The 1993 Waco siege is again
instructive.  In that incident, federal law enforcement agents served a
“search warrant” with dozens of agents and military air support, and
the agents used military rifles, grenades, and vehicles to lay siege to
the compound.41  The ensuing violence claimed many lives without
the protections of due process.42  Extensive training in military tactics
necessarily makes police more likely to choose them, even where alter-
native solutions exist.43
More direct subversion of civil law enforcement may occur
through administrative action.  For example, an administrative “trans-
fer” of military members from the Department of Defense to the
Department of Homeland Security might allow the government to
avoid the legal restrictions on domestic military use.44  In more sinis-
ter scenarios, other agencies might color the truth of situations to
prompt military involvement.45  Such dubious practices might comply
with the letter of the law in statutes restricting domestic military use,
but do little to address the underlying threat to personal freedoms.
B. Domestic Situations Uniquely Suited to Military Intervention
Though domestic use of the military presents significant dangers
to civil liberties, situations exist where the need to protect life, prop-
erty, and the “general welfare” outweighs that threat.  The military
may be the only force able to uphold laws and protect citizens where
state agencies refuse or are unable to meet that obligation.  For exam-
ple, the military may be the only organization with the manpower and
logistical capability to deliver humanitarian relief and protect citizens
40 See Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing risks of
military enforcement of civil law to rights and the long American tradition against
abuses of standing armies).
41 See DANFORTH REPORT, supra note 17, at 131–34 (describing the official report R
of the initial raid on the Branch Davidian compound); Kopel & Blackman, supra note
38, at 631–35 (discussing the use of military style weaponry during the Waco siege). R
42 See DANFORTH REPORT supra note 17, at 131–34. R
43 See EDWARD S.G. DENNIS, JR., EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING OF THE BRANCH
DAVIDIAN STAND-OFF IN WACO, TEXAS FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL 19, 1993 43–44 (1993)
(highlighting dysfunction between negotiating and tactical teams and the use of force
despite recommendations to do otherwise).
44 See Melvin G. Deaile, Crossing the Line: A Study of the Legal Permissibility of
Using Federalized Troops to Protect the Nation’s Borders 10 (Jun. 2003) (unpub-
lished research report) (on file with the U.S. Army War College), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADa416373
45 See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 38, at 628 (“[Military agencies are] often R
aware that civilian agencies are fabricating a pretext for military involvement, but . . .
[do not] even care.”).
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in areas ravaged by natural disasters.  In some circumstances, the mili-
tary responsibility to defend our borders can overlap with the need to
carry out domestic law, as in monitoring national borders or combat-
ing transnational threats backed by criminal enterprises.
1. Military Law Enforcement Where Other Agencies Fail
The United States Constitution guarantees all citizens equal pro-
tection of the laws.46  Individual states, at various times, interposed
their authority to circumvent that protection and frustrate federal law
enforcement efforts.47  For example, during the Civil Rights move-
ment of the 1950s and 1960s, Army troops enforced federal court
orders mandating the integration of public schools.48  Federal military
forces confronted, at least symbolically, state police and military forces
in the process.  In many cases, the military is the only federal organiza-
tion with the power to overcome such state defiance.  Those interven-
tions are happily rare, but this capability is necessary to prevent states
from encroaching on federal authority or oppressing their own
citizens.
More complex issues surround military intervention where states
have proven incapable of enforcing federal laws or their own laws.
Such situations can be prompted by sudden outbursts of widespread
civil unrest.49  They can also occur in areas ravaged by natural disaster
where basic social services and governance have broken down.50  In
such circumstances, military law enforcement may be preferable to no
law enforcement.  The need to protect life and property conflicts with
the limitations of federal authority: under the limited powers granted
by the Constitution, the federal government has no general police
46  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
47 See, e.g, WILLIAM DOYLE, AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION 6 (2003) (describing
Arkansas’s use of National Guard troops to block minority elementary students from
entering school).
48 Id. at 296 (summarizing use of National Guard and Army troops to enforce
desegregation of the University of Mississippi).
49 Los Angeles, California has twice been ravaged by riots so severe that they
required military intervention. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text for dis- R
cussions of the 1965 Watts riots and the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los Angeles.
50 In 1992, Hurricane Andrew prompted a federal military relief effort along
these lines, and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina is perhaps the most famous case-study of
this situation. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Sending Army to Florida Amid Criticism of
Relief Effort: Urgency Is Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at A1; see also infra notes
98–102 and accompanying text discussing lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. R
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power to protect the health, welfare, and safety of citizens.51  How-
ever, immediate threats of human injury, death, and loss of livelihood
put significant pressure on the federal government to act even when
proper authority is uncertain.  For example, the federal relief effort to
Hurricane Katrina–ravaged New Orleans was widely criticized as inad-
equate, despite the fact that primary disaster relief responsibility
rested with state and local officials.52  As looting and lawlessness over-
whelmed an American city, the specter of idle federal troops
prompted much controversy.53  Resolving this mismatch in capability
and authority is hotly debated and remains a challenge.
2. Situations Where the Line Between Crime and National Security
is Blurred
Domestic emergencies are not the only domain where military
use may be favored.  Emerging threats in the twenty-first century have
blurred distinctions between foreign threats best handled by the mili-
tary and criminal activity in the purview of law enforcement.  For
example, border security implicates both protection against terrorist
attacks and civil concerns such as immigration control.54  The illegal
drug trade both ravages communities at home and funds activities of
foreign enemies, and often extends across borders and nation-states.55
Fiscal constraints push against investment in redundant capabilities,
such as purchasing separate radar systems for law enforcement and
defense uses.  In some circumstances, criminal elements turn to mili-
tary technologies to further their aims.  For example, South American
drug cartels use stealth submarines to facilitate drug smuggling unde-
tected by civil authorities.56  Traditional law enforcement is ill-
equipped to address this type of threat.  The military has unique capa-
51 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. amend XIV, § 5 (enumerating authorized federal
powers).
52 See Sean Alfano, Katrina Response Sparks Outrage, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:10
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/05/60minutes/main815179.shtml
(reporting on frustrations over bureaucratic friction that contributed to a lack of
action during Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath).
53 See id.
54 See generally Brian R. Wahlquist, Note, Slamming the Door on Terrorists and the
Drug Trade While Increasing Legal Immigration: Temporary Deployment of the United States
Military at the Borders, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 551 (2005) (arguing for militarization of
the southern U.S. border to suppress drug activity and interdict terrorist infiltration).
55 See Eric Schmitt, Diverse Sources Pour Cash into Taliban’s War Chest, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2009, at A1. (discussing diverse funding from drugs and other criminal activ-
ity to Afghanistan’s Taliban fighters).
56 See William Booth & Juan Forero, Plying the Pacific, Subs Surface as Key Tool of
Drug Cartels, WASH. POST, June 6, 2009, at A1.
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bilities useful to law enforcement in certain scenarios, such as tracking
and intercepting foreign air and sea threats, or gathering information
in far-flung combat zones relevant to domestic criminal matters.  Man-
aging these capabilities responsibly remains an elusive, yet necessary,
goal.
II. HOW TO HANDLE THE SPEAR: MILITARY FORCES AND
DOCTRINAL EMPLOYMENT
A. Military Organizations and Their Legal Authority
Evaluation of laws that govern domestic military use-of-force
requires consideration of not only competing policy objectives, but
also the capabilities of the forces they govern.  To understand what is
appropriate and possible for military forces to accomplish, a basic
understanding of military structure is required.
1. Federal Military Forces
The Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are
the five primary armed services of the United States.57  Each has both
active-duty and reserve components.58  Active duty military members
serve full-time and are professional members of the standing military
force.59  The reserve force is composed of military personnel that
train part-time, and simultaneously maintain other careers.60  These
forces may only support federal missions when called into active-duty
57 The Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are “Military Departments”
organized under the Secretary of Defense. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY DEPART-
MENTS, (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/#3.  The Coast Guard is
unique in that it is the only armed service of the United States organized under the
Department of Homeland Security and has an express charter to perform law
enforcement functions in U.S. territorial waters. See U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. COAST
GUARD HISTORY, http://www.uscg.mil/history/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
58 10 U.S.C. § 10101 (2006) (naming the reserve components of armed forces).
59 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ACTIVE DUTY & ARMY, http://www.goarmy.
com/about/service-options/active-duty-and-reserve-duty.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2012).
60 These reserve forces form a pool of readily trained and equipped individuals
who can be activated to support military missions as needed.  When not needed, they
resume civilian employment.  This allows for instant “growth” of an armed service for
a mission without the cost of employing those members full-time.
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service.61  Both active-duty and reserve forces are limited to federal
constitutional authority and are subject to federal laws.62
2. State National Guard: A Dual-Role Force
In contrast, military forces under state control are called the
National Guard.63  The very text of the Constitution forbids states
from maintaining standing, professional military forces.64  As such, all
National Guard forces train part-time in a manner similar to federal
reserve forces until activated.65
When activated by a state governor, the National Guard operates
under state law and under the broader scope of state general sover-
eignty.66  In this status, known as state active duty, Guard forces may
take any action consistent with constitutional guarantees and their
state’s laws to protect public health, welfare, and safety.67  In a similar
status referred to as “Title 32,” National Guard members may operate
at state direction with federal funding.68  Typical state-controlled mis-
sions for National Guard members include relief efforts following a
natural disaster and responses to widespread civil disorder that over-
whelms normal law enforcement.69
National Guard forces must serve two masters.  The “Calling
Forth” clause of the Constitution authorizes the President to exert
control over state militias when called into federal service.70  Thus,
presidential orders can fold National Guard members instantly into
the federal military to perform federal missions.  When so “federal-
ized,” National Guard forces operate only with federal authority, and
61 See LAWRENCE KAPP, RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL ISSUES 7–8 (2010)
(describing differences in federal reserve forces and the dual status of the National
Guard).
62 See id. at 11 (describing Posse Comitatus Act restrictions on active and reserve
components of federal armed services).
63 See id. at 8.
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace.”).
65 See KAPP, supra note 61, at 8 (explaining that National Guard forces are consid- R
ered descendent from state militias within the Constitution’s meaning).
66 Id. at 10.
67 See id. at 21.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 18–19.
70 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o provide for call-
ing forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army . . . and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States.”).
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their range of permissible actions is narrower.71  In this status,
National Guard forces perform the full range of federal military mis-
sions, including combat rotations in foreign conflict zones.72
To ensure National Guard readiness to meet federal missions, the
federal government spends considerable resources to train and equip
them.73  National Guard military organization, equipment, and train-
ing is nominally identical to their active-duty counterparts.74  After the
September 11th attacks, it became commonplace for nominally part-
time National Guard units to train for and deploy to numerous for-
eign combat rotations.75   Therefore, National Guard forces differ
from active-duty forces only in three respects: their orders may come
from a governor or the President; they may be employed according to
general state sovereignty or limited federal sovereignty; and by Consti-
tutional mandate they must be part-time.
B. Principles of Military Doctrine: Guideposts for Success
To correctly employ military forces, military leaders must give
orders that translate political goals into specific military actions.  Fed-
eral laws and political leaders often focus on whether military force
should be used.  Laws, decision-making processes, and executive deci-
sions, however, can also impact whether the military can be success-
fully used.  Military planning doctrine identifies certain characteristics
that embody successful operations, and these may not be well under-
stood by the controlling political leadership.76  This misunderstanding
can interfere with mission success and lead to undesired outcomes.  In
71 See KAPP, supra note 61, at 19–20. R
72  See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND
LOGISTICS, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 9 (2007), available
at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA478163.pdf [hereinafter DSB Report]
(detailing deployments of multiple National Guard Brigade Combat Teams for Iraq
and Afghanistan).
73 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06170T, RESERVE FORCES: ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD’S ROLE, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 18
(2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States)
[hereinafter GAO Report] (examining the budget needed to reorganize National
Guard formations to the same structure as the Army).
74 Id. at 8 (“While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state mis-
sions, the Guard  is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and
these take priority over state missions.”).
75 See DSB REPORT, supra note 72, at 9. R
76 See FM 3-0, supra note 9, at A-1 (discussing the fundamental nature of the prin- R
ciples of war to successful operations and noting that their tenets have stood the tests
of analysis, experimentation, and practice).
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a domestic context, this Note considers the four “Principles of War”
most relevant to domestic military use: Objective, Mass, Simplicity,
and Unity of Command.77
1. Objective
“Objective” requires that planners “[d]irect every military opera-
tion toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective”; to
use only “appropriate” force (i.e., lethality); and to ensure achieve-
ment of “political goals” that foster the “willing acceptance of a law-
fully constituted government.”78
Successful operations embody this principle. For example, Army
paratroopers enforced the integration of Arkansas schools in 1957.
Their objective was clearly defined: protect nine minority elementary
students from state or other interference during their enrollment at
an integrated school.79  Their objective was attainable: the overwhelm-
ing troop presence, 1,000 soldiers for a single school, guaranteed that
no one would interfere with the integration.80  And, most importantly,
their objective was decisive: the demonstration of federal resolve to
enforce federal integration policy achieved the President’s goal of
judicial enforcement.81  The volume of troops employed also elimi-
nated the need for lethal force that may have undermined the federal
government’s legitimacy.82
Conversely, failed operations often ignore this tenet of clearly
defining a decisive and attainable objective.  For example, in the
1990s, small Marine Corps units deployed to the U.S. border with
Mexico to assist law enforcement in surveillance of drug traffic.83  The
77 The remaining five principles of war (Maneuver, Offensive, Surprise, Security,
and Economy of Force) are no less critical to military operations.  However, they are
more relevant to traditional combat operations and reflect military concerns not read-
ily influenced by domestic law and policy.  See id. at A-1, A-2 for a discussion of these
principles.
78 Id. at A-1.
79 See DOYLE, supra note 47, at 13–16 (describing military action to protect the R
Little Rock Nine).
80 KASEY S. PIPES, IKE’S FINAL BATTLE 243–44 (2007) (describing President Eisen-
hower’s federalization of the Alabama National Guard and deployment of the 101st
Airborne Division to Little Rock).
81 Id. at 240 (“[The President] will use the full power of the United States includ-
ing whatever force may be necessary to prevent any obstruction of the law and to carry
out the orders of the Federal Court.”).
82  See DOYLE, supra note 47, at 16 (“The ‘Battle of Little Rock’ was over nearly as R
soon as it started, without a single serious injury and without a shot fired.”).
83 See MAJOR GENERAL JOHN T. COYNE, INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE JOINT TASK FORCE-6 (JTF-6) SHOOTING INCIDENT THAT
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objects of the assistance were not clearly defined, and, as such, Marine
Corps leaders viewed the mission primarily as a training opportunity
for their combat mission.84  The object was not attainable: the amount
of troops used was too small to successfully interdict smuggling, lead-
ing to a long-term presence.85  The resulting operation was expensive
and not decisive.  These flaws came to light after a hidden Marine
outpost accidentally shot and killed a teenage shepherd in Texas.86
Of course, certain military objectives might be “decisive” and “attaina-
ble” but still problematic.  Viewed in callous terms, the 1970 Kent
State shootings achieved a decisive end to disorderly protests on the
campus, though it is hard to imagine the incident being hailed as
legitimate or successful.87
2. Mass
U.S. military doctrine refers to “mass” in civil-assistance roles as
“providing the proper forces at the right time and place to alleviate
suffering and provide security.”88  Examining different domestic mili-
tary responses reveals two main factors crucial to achieving this princi-
ple: the speed of response and the quantity of forces.89
Unsurprisingly, swift responses by large, capable forces generate bet-
ter outcomes than delayed responses by small, ineffective forces.
Constitutional requirements factor prominently into the mili-
tary’s ability to respond quickly.  The Constitution mandates that state
military forces be based on a part-time militia model.90  As such,
delays are inevitable when disparate force members must receive an
alert, travel to armories, draw equipment, and then plan and issue
instructions.  More indirectly, part-time leadership can lead to plan-
ning delays and “friction” during mobilization.  The California
National Guard response to the 1992 Los Angeles riots illustrates the
difficulties.  Following the alert, seventeen hours elapsed before signif-
OCCURRED ON 20 MAY 1997 NEAR THE BORDER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEX-
ICO 1 (1998) [hereinafter COYNE REPORT].
84 See id. at 25 (“This [Marine Unit] has received a great training deployment
opportunity in support of the nation’s war on drugs. . . . [The desired end state is:]
. . . professional support to assigned law enforcement agencies . . . and a more combat
ready unit.”).
85 See id. at 8 (detailing over one-hundred missions over a five-year period).
86 See Marine to be Charged in Border Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at A11.
87 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. R
88 FM 3-0, supra note 9, at A-2. R
89 FM 3-0’s emphasis on “massing effects” is generally applicable only for tradi-
tional warfighting missions.
90 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. R
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icant National Guard forces were mobilized.91  The alert was frus-
trated by staff-planning details such as movement of aircraft, delivery
of ammunition, and availability of required weapons components.92
During those lost hours, chaos raged in the city resulting in millions
of dollars of property damage.93  Frustrations over the delays eventu-
ally led the California governor to request a federal troop
intervention.
The difficulties during the 1992 response stand in stark relief to
an almost identical California Guard alert to the 1965 Los Angeles
riots.  There, by coincidence, nearly 14,000 Guardsmen had assem-
bled for an annual two-week training exercise on the eve of the riots.94
The National Guard response to that incident was far more decisive,
as the logistics of mobilization were already accomplished.95
Delays in state response often arise from the structure of a part-
time militia force.  In contrast, delays in federal responses can result
from procedural requirements or hesitation by political leaders.  Lack-
ing general sovereign authority, federal forces may only respond if
authorized by the Constitution or federal law.96  Ensuring compliance
with statutory criteria takes time, as does determining the appropriate
role for forces if committed.97  Political infighting or contests for con-
trol can also add to delay.98  Often the decision-making process can
last longer than the physical deployment of troops.  For example, the
Department of Defense alerted federal paratroopers for an assistance
mission to the overwhelmed Louisiana National Guard in the after-
91 See Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Lessons in Command and Control from the Los
Angeles Riots, PARAMETERS, Summer 1997, 88, 96–98, available at http://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=445945.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 88–89 (describing the scale of destruction during the 1992 L.A. riots).
94 CALIF. NAT’L GUARD, A REPORT CONCERNING THE CALIFORNIA NATIONAL
GUARD’S PART IN SUPPRESSING THE LOS ANGELES RIOT—AUGUST 1965 10 (1965) availa-
ble at http://www.militarymuseum.org/Watts.pdf (describing readiness posture of the
California Air and Army National Guard on August 13, 1965).
95 See id. at 13–14 (describing the total time from initial alert to battalion-sized
deployment at only eight hours).
96 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. R
97 See Schnaubelt, supra note 91, at 14 (describing the multiple layers of bureau- R
cracy that mission approval required during the federal troop occupation in 1992 and
noting that this approval process often took six to eight hours and required daily
revalidation).
98 See Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2005, at A1.
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math of Hurricane Katrina.99  Though capable of responding world-
wide within eighteen hours, the paratroopers’ movement to flood-
stricken New Orleans did not occur for nearly a week amidst conflict-
ing reports of need and federal and state political debate.100  Even
then, the movement came only after the military commander’s initia-
tive to hold an emergency “training exercise,” with the so-called scena-
rio involving the division’s assistance to New Orleans after a
catastrophic hurricane.101  Once there, the large, full-time force
quickly contributed to the Katrina relief efforts.102
3. Simplicity
The United States Army manual for operations directs leaders to
“[p]repare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to
ensure thorough understanding.”103  This common sense principle
plays a large part in the success or failure of domestic military
missions.
Unfortunately, the requirements of federal law can add layers of
bureaucracy that slow responses and limit options.  The 1992 Los
Angeles riots again provide a useful vignette.  Following the California
Guard’s slow mobilization, military leaders directed that their units
directly assist Los Angeles police in their law enforcement districts.104
This avoided duplicate planning and further delays, and the scheme
took advantage of police familiarity with their districts.105  Under this
model, nearly all police requests for assistance were approved.106  The
influx of troops and close cooperation quickly reduced violence in the
city.  This efficient arrangement did not survive federalization.  When
President George H.W. Bush assumed control of the California Guard
and dispatched federal troops to Los Angeles, the federal military
units scrutinized each request for assistance for compliance with fed-
eral law.107  Law enforcement request-approval plummeted to twenty
99 See Julian E. Barnes, Diary of a Mad Hurricane: The 82nd Airborne—A Waiting




102 See Gerry J. Gilmore, 82nd Airborne Division Becomes ‘Waterborne’ in New Orleans,
U.S. DEPT. OF DEF. (Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=17253.
103 See FM 3-0, supra note 9, at A-3. R
104 See Schnaubelt, supra note 91, at 11. R
105 See id.
106 See id. at 13.
107 See id.
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percent, as missions authorized the day prior to federalization were
illegal the next day, even though some of the same forces were
involved.108  Further, federal military commanders divided their oper-
ations along military terrain features rather than police districts.109  In
some circumstances, this resulted in single military units attempting to
coordinate with multiple law enforcement districts.110  This “reinvent-
ing the wheel” to ensure tight, centralized control reduced the effec-
tiveness of the responding troops.111
4. Unity of Command/Unity of Effort
Unity of Command is achieved when “a single commander
directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common
objective.”112  Where both military and non-military organizations are
involved, doctrine directs commanders to “cooperate, negotiate, and
build consensus to achieve unity of effort.”113  Unity of Command and
Effort enables the preceding three principals to flourish by preventing
confusing, contradictory, overlapping, and misaligned orders.
The 1957 military integration of Little Rock represents the classic
implementation of this principal.  All responsibility for the mission
was placed with a military general, who efficiently directed a purely-
military force to carry out the mission.114  A similar federal interven-
tion in 1962 demonstrated the consequences when leaders ignore this
principle.  The federal integration of the University of Mississippi
involved U.S. Marshals, regular U.S. Army units, and federalized ele-
ments of the Mississippi National Guard.115  At various times during
the crisis, contradictory orders arrived from the President, the Army
commanding general, and the Deputy Attorney General.116  Despite
the urgency of a violent, deadly, 2000-person campus riot, the
employed forces only managed a piecemeal, halting, and confused
108 See id.
109 See id. at 12–13.
110 See id.
111 See id. at 13.
112 See FM 3-0, supra note 9, at A-3. R
113 See id.
114 See DOYLE, supra note 47, at 13–16 (describing Major General Walker’s direc- R
tion of the Little Rock mission).
115 See id. at 104–09 (describing the organization of Marshals and Army troops for
the University of Mississippi integration mission); id. at 239–40 (describing the feder-
alization of a dutiful, if reluctant, Mississippi National Guard for the same purpose).
116 See id. at 228–29 (describing the sharp breakdown in command during the riot
response).
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response.117  Cooperation among these elements eventually achieved
a coordinated response to the situation, but it bore little resemblance
to the orderly Little Rock intervention.118
In examining lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina relief
effort, the U.S. government recognized that achieving unity of effort
was a systemic difficulty.119  Since then, agencies such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) devote greater energy to
training under a common planning template for federal, state, and
local agencies to help achieve unity of effort.120  Lawmakers also
passed short-lived laws expanding Presidential authority in such situa-
tions to allow a single chain-of-command to the executive branch.121
Those statutes ran afoul of concerns over potential abuses of executive
power and encroachment on state authority.122
III. FEDERAL LAW: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SOCIAL POLICY
AND MILITARY DOCTRINE
The Constitution and federal laws form a connecting bridge
between the policy considerations of domestic military use and doctri-
nally sound military employment.  Both realms are essential: a doctri-
nally sound intervention that compromises social policies is as
undesirable as a politically sound intervention that fails to comply with
essential doctrine.  A proper evaluation of current laws must first
assess the laws according to how well they balance these competing
priorities.
A. The Posse Comitatus Act
Perhaps the most controversial and ill-understood federal law reg-
ulating domestic military operations is the Posse Comitatus Act of
1878 (PCA).  Passed into law during the Reconstruction period follow-
ing the American Civil War, the as-amended PCA in its entirety reads
117 See id. at 233–45 (describing the chaos of troop deployment).
118 See id.
119 See FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 13, 55 (2006).
120 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
TRAINING PROGRAM (2011), available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/
NIMSTrainingCourses.shtm (outlining national response framework training accord-
ing to post-Katrina requirements).
121 See PAUL J. SAUSVILLE, DOD RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS—WHY THE
NATIONAL GUARD IS OFF LIMITS 9–14 (2008), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA480193.
122 See id. at 2.
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Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of
the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to exe-
cute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.123
  Literally translated from Latin, posse comitatus means the “power of
the county.”  At common-law, this concept allowed law enforcement
officials to summon able bodied men as a temporary police force to
combat riots or to pursue felons and was roughly analogous to sum-
moning a militia for law enforcement purposes.124  Most policy mak-
ers and military commanders interpret the law as a general
prohibition against using the military to enforce domestic laws.125
Substantial disagreement exists about the PCA’s policy aims and
its effectiveness.  Some commentators characterize it as a burdensome
straitjacket, needlessly restricting military use in emergency situa-
tions.126  Others claim that it is a proper bulwark against military tyr-
anny and that it reflects a long-standing American tradition of civilian
law enforcement.127  Still others argue that it is essentially meaningless
and merely offers political cover for politicians who fail or choose not
to act.128
While the PCA’s policy aims may be hotly debated, the Act exerts
substantial influence on military planners.129  The PCA clearly prohib-
123 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
124 See Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 240–41 (4th Cir. 1973) (“English common
law . . . authorized a sheriff to summon bystanders to assist him in apprehending
felons.”).
125 See Michael Greenberger, Did the Founding Fathers Do “A Heckuva Job”?  Constitu-
tional Authorization for the Use of Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City,
87 B.U. L. REV. 397, 410 (2007) (“[L]ay observers, especially military commanders
and first responders at all levels of government, focus[ ] almost exclusively on the
prohibition within the PCA . . . .”).
126 See, e.g., Commander Gary Felicetti & Lieutenant John Luce, The Posse Comita-
tus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any
More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV 86, 179 (2003) (“[T]he current interpretation of
the Posse Comitatus Act . . . impedes [the counter-terrorism] mission and does little
to protect civil liberties.”).
127 See generally Hammond, supra note 11 (arguing for the protection of PCA R
restrictions); Kealy, supra note 1 (cautioning against the militarization of law enforce- R
ment and appropriateness of PCA).
128 See Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy
Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government’s Alibi for the Hurricane
Katrina Disaster, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 117, 146–47 (2008) (describing how the PCA was
allegedly used as an excuse for operational failures).
129 See supra notes 104–111 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 21 16-AUG-12 9:49
2012] a  soldier’s-eye  view  of  the  homefront 2211
its certain classes of actions, such as searches and seizures.130  Others
are permitted and uncontroversial, such as military delivery of relief
supplies under the Stafford Act.131  Without explicit authority, the
PCA’s vague contours can make military commanders overly cautious
and impede effectiveness.  For example, the PCA can compromise set-
ting decisive objectives: a federal soldier delivering relief supplies
under the Stafford Act may not stop looters or respond to other law-
lessness, where an identically trained and equipped state National
Guard soldier may perform both roles.  Additionally, the PCA can
hamper simplicity.  The ability for military planners to issue simple,
concise orders can be compromised when commanders must scruti-
nize every decision for compliance with the uncertain boundaries of
the PCA.132
Nevertheless, the PCA is a valuable safeguard against unrestricted
military use and encroachment on civil liberties.  This Note suggests
the problems associated with the PCA are better addressed through
coherent, flexible exceptions to the PCA rule, rather than abolition of
the rule itself.
B. The Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act predates the PCA,133 and it outlines the cri-
teria that must be satisfied for the President to use the “militia” and
“armed forces” in response to domestic emergencies.  The first section
of the amended Act authorizes the president to use military force to
assist states in suppressing insurrections against their governments,
provided the legislature or governor of that state has requested the
130 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (excluding
evidence seized by an Army Central Intelligence Division agent during a civilian drug
search).
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170a (2006).  This section of the Stafford Act justifies use of
Department of Defense resources to deliver relief supplies and other aid and draws
little controversy.  In the case of Hurricane Katrina, it appears that while authority to
deliver relief supplies immediately was not in question, military planners were reluc-
tant to send federal troops into a volatile and largely lawless situation with limited
ability to protect themselves or the supplies. See Lipton et al., supra note 98 and R
accompanying text.
132 The vague scope of the PCA exacerbates the problem.  The military leadership
during the 1992 Los Angeles riots parsed their orders to “restore order” as an uncer-
tain mandate to “maintain” law and order.  They therefore scrutinized missions for
compliance with the PCA even when operating under a Congressional PCA excep-
tion. See Schnaubelt, supra note 91, at 13. R
133 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331–335).
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assistance.134  The second section addresses unilateral action by the
President, which is authorized when there are “combinations, assem-
blages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States” that
make it impracticable to enforce federal laws in “ordinary . . . judicial
proceedings.”135  The third and final section allows the President to
use military force when “insurrection[s], domestic violence, unlawful
combination[s], or conspirac[ies]” threaten equal protection of Con-
stitutional privileges or obstruct federal law enforcement, and states
are unable, fail, or refuse to enable that equal protection.136
The Insurrection Act is clearly rooted in constitutional authority
and articulates a clear policy balance.137  The narrow employment cri-
teria mitigate the dangers of excessive lethal force and military threats
to civil liberties.  Only incidents that threaten enforcement of laws or
jeopardize class-wide constitutional rights warrant military use of
force.  These criteria are defined with enough precision to allow polit-
ical confidence in taking military action.138  The military-enforced
134 See 10 U.S.C. § 331, which states,
Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any State against its government,
the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the
legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia
of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of
the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
135 See 10 U.S.C. § 332, which states in full,
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations,
or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make
it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such
of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
136 See 10 U.S.C. § 333, which reads,
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any
other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress,
in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy, if it—
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable,
fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that
protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or
impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have
denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
137 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. R
138 See supra Part I.B.1.
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school integrations at Little Rock and the University of Mississippi
raised little question of proper military authority in the face of state
defiance of judicial order and obstruction of federal law.139  The Act
reflects an enhanced scope of authority with state consent, as federal
military forces may assist in suppressing purely state insurrections with
state consent.140
In terms of military doctrine, the Insurrection Act fosters forma-
tion of “defined, attainable, and decisive” objectives.141  The text per-
mits much freedom of action to defeat law-threatening insurrections,
conspiracies, or state defiance.142  Enforcement of federal law and the
equal protection of constitutional rights supports the objective princi-
ple’s legitimacy prong.  The Act also supports “mass”; reliance on
presidential judgment or state judgment alone presents little obstacle
to rapid deployment of sufficient forces.  Achievement of simplicity is
also supported, as dispersal of rioters, gaining control of ground, and
suppression of widespread violence are traditional military roles and
lend themselves to uncomplicated orders.  This same freedom addi-
tionally fosters simple directives from a unified chain-of-command.
All authority is expressly vested in the President as commander-in-
chief, and the conditions of employment necessarily involve tradi-
tional military competencies.
The Act’s narrow military intervention criteria, however, can limit
federal options in lawless situations caused by natural disaster or other
catastrophes.  Oriented towards criminal actions and other inten-
tional obstruction of laws, the Insurrection Act’s authority does not
clearly extend to chaos resulting from natural disasters or other condi-
tions that threaten the “health, welfare, and safety” of citizens outside
of specific federal jurisdiction.  These gaps in capability form the core
of arguments for repeal of the PCA or for expanding the role of the
Insurrection Act.143
139 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. R
140 See 10 U.S.C. § 331.
141 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. R
142 See supra notes 134–37 (clarifying that the use of military force comes at the R
President’s discretion).
143 See Greenberger, supra note 125, at 414 (discussing Congressional concerns R
that the Insurrection Act did not clearly specify natural disasters and other calamitous
events).
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C. Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
Officials (MCCLE)
Originally passed in 1981,144 the as-amended laws authorizing
military cooperation with civilian law enforcement span ten sections
of the federal code and establish criteria for military cooperation with
civilian law enforcement officials.  They are designed to support
counter-drug interdiction, counter-terrorism, customs and border
security, and responses to threats posed by weapons of mass destruc-
tion.145  They encourage the Department of Defense to share informa-
tion and intelligence with civilian law enforcement agencies.146  They
allow military personnel to perform surveillance on air, sea, and cer-
tain surface traffic, provided the initial detection occurred outside
U.S. borders.147  They authorize military members to transport law
enforcement agents, but the laws contain a general provision against
“direct participation” in law enforcement by military members.148
The laws define direct participation as participation in a search,
seizure, or similar activity.149
The two most troublesome parts of these laws are provisions that
permit military training of law enforcement and authorize military-to-
police loans of “equipment” and “equipment operators,” even when
the police role does not directly enforce federal laws or policy
objectives.150
The policy picture presented by these laws is unclear.  The Act’s
provisions address some intersections between criminal law and
national security, specifically terrorist threats and the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction.151  However, the original act oriented
on combating the drug trade, and its provisions reflect this focus—
particularly in how expansive assistance can be to local law enforce-
ment.  Concerns over use of lethal force remain, as shown by past inci-
dents such as the Waco siege and the Marine Corps Texas border
shooting.152  Similarly, concerns over military encroachment on civil
liberties persist despite a prohibition against “direct participation” in
144 Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95
Stat. 1114, 1114–16 (1981).
145 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–382.
146 See id. at § 371.
147 See id. at § 374(b)(2)(B).
148 See id. at § 374(b)(2)(F)(i), § 374(c).
149 See id. at § 375.
150 See id. at §§ 374–375.
151 See id. at § 374(b)(1)(C), § 382.
152 See supra notes 41–43, 83–86 and accompanying text. R
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“searches and seizures.”153  Concerns regarding surveillance and inva-
sion-of-privacy are also present, aggravated by the Act’s directive to
share military intelligence with civilian law enforcement agencies.154
“Militarization” of civilian law enforcement is aggravated by military-
provided experts, equipment, and equipment operators.155
The “power of the purse” is the most effective check on abuse
within this Act; other law enforcement agencies must pay cossts for
military use unless the participation is in pursuit of federal aims.156
This can be a powerful deterrent given the high costs of military
equipment, but it can also lead to pretextual interventions under
weak (or manufactured) evidence supporting a federal role.157
Another check on abuse is the requirement that military combat read-
iness cannot be reduced by law enforcement missions.158  While pre-
sumably preventing the Secretary of Defense from turning the
million-plus members of the armed services into national police, the
scope of this restriction remains ill-defined.159
This law-enforcement-assistance mission presents vexing
problems to military leaders attempting to adhere to planning doc-
trine.  The dual requirements to avoid direct participation and main-
tain combat readiness severely constrain military options, and they
inhibit defining decisive and attainable objectives.160  Routine military
participation in law enforcement invites excessive use of force or mili-
tary searches and surveillance; these undermine the objective princi-
ple’s legitimacy component.161  The readiness constraint disrupts the
ability to achieve mass, as every unit detailed to law enforcement is
unavailable for combat missions.162  Simplicity is compromised by
these confusing, contradictory, and misaligned requirements.  Contra-
dictory instructions from military and law enforcement leaders can
153 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (describing when these prohibi- R
tions were not obeyed).
154 See id.; 10 U.S.C. § 371.
155 See supra Part I.B.3.
156 See 10 U.S.C. § 377.
157 See Kopel & Blackman, supra note 38, at 624–27 (discussing alleged drug pre- R
text in the Waco raid).
158 See 10 U.S.C. § 376.
159 No metric for “readiness” is specified in the statute.  See id.
160 See supra notes 148, 158.  In regards to the multi-billion dollar drug problem, R
any decisive and attainable military role would almost certainly reduce readiness and
require direct participation.
161 See supra Part I.B.1.
162 See COYNE REPORT, supra note 83, at 43 (reporting that from a Marine Division R
numbering over 10,000, only thirty-two Marines participated in the border surveil-
lance mission).
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easily frustrate Unity of Command.163  Unity of Effort is similarly com-
promised by the partial participation allowed by military members.164
In light of these difficulties, the comparable lack of effectiveness and
tragic history of the MCCLE mission is not surprising.
The sum effect of these laws is as follows: the PCA essentially pro-
hibits all military law enforcement without a clear Congressional man-
date.  It exerts a strong background presence because of vague
contours and its interpretation by political and military leaders.
The Insurrection Act is well-tailored to state or criminal defiance
of laws but has uncertain provisions to address other calamities
impacting civil law enforcement.  Part-time state military forces can
have difficulty countering these situations alone.
Laws governing MCCLE help combat hybrid national security
and criminal threats and prevent fiscal waste from redundant capabili-
ties.  These benefits come at the cost of excessive use of force, reduced
military readiness or ineffective missions, and militarization of civil law
enforcement agencies.
IV. WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES: PROPOSED CHANGES
TO FEDERAL LAW
A. “Loosing The Dogs” — A Political-Safeguards Only Model
Commentators chafing at the PCA’s restrictions often argue for a
substantial narrowing of its interpretation.165  Alternatively, propo-
nents of the MCCLE laws argue that Congress must lift the restrictions
regarding search and seizure to achieve the desired ends.166  Frustra-
tion regarding artificial limitations on military options is the driving
force behind these views, and the core idea is that mission success can
only result from full application of military muscle.
From a military doctrine standpoint, this notion has great appeal.
A repeal of the PCA would eliminate the time consuming process of
parsing military versus law-enforcement missions.167  This freedom
would allow the President the full spectrum of military capability to
implement the most defined, decisive, and attainable objectives.  The
freedom also helps to achieve mass by permitting use of any force
quantity deemed appropriate.  Simplicity is enhanced as orders avoid
163 Military participation as “equipment operators” and “experts” necessarily
implicates that they will not direct the operations they participate in. See supra note
150.  Thus, military equipment is directed by persons less trained in their use. R
164 See id.
165 See generally Dougherty, supra note 5 (arguing that the PCA is unnecessary). R
166 See Miller, supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
167 See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. R
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awkward restrictions that prohibit necessary law enforcement tasks.
Further, having all authority flow downward from the President exem-
plifies classic unity of command.168  The PCA’s repeal would also alle-
viate absurd results—federal forces would enjoy the same freedom of
action during employment as state National Guard forces.
However, the desire for efficient military operations cannot
trump our fundamental principles of government.  Repeal of the PCA
or otherwise expanding military power in this realm may inadvertently
create a more efficient instrument of tyranny.  The blurred lines
between national security threats and domestic criminal activity may
be used to justify greater, unwanted involvement of the military in
domestic law enforcement.169  The dangers of unnecessary lethal
force and chilled civil liberties remain unresolved.  Additional train-
ing of military personnel for law enforcement roles may be unsuccess-
ful, or the additional missions may detract too heavily from wartime
readiness.170  Perhaps the most ominous risk is the potential for
blurred lines of accountability between states and the federal govern-
ment for law enforcement.  State officials might ask the federal gov-
ernment to undertake politically unpopular military interventions in
their home state or use military forces to send a political message.
Indeed, the adoption and subsequent repeal of Insurrection Act
amendments demonstrate a lack of broad-based political support for
measures of this type.  In 2007, Congress passed the “Warner Amend-
ments” to the Insurrection Act that dramatically increased the scope
of the President’s authority.171  The revised statute contained provi-
sions authorizing interventions for insurrection, natural disaster, pub-
lic health emergencies, and “any other condition” that would serve to
deprive a class of persons the equal protections of the law.172  Notably,
the amendments included no provision for state consent.173  This may
be unsurprising given the lack of state-federal cooperation exhibited
during the Hurricane Katrina relief effort.  Nevertheless, concerns
over this dramatic expansion of Presidential authority caused repeal
of the revised statute only a year later.174  The clear implication is pub-
168 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. R
169 See supra Part I.B.2.
170 Blending the two has proven to be difficult to balance. See Marine to Be Charged,
supra note 86. R
171 See Greenberger, supra note 125, at 414–15 (discussing the 2007 Warner R
Amendments to the Insurrection Act).
172 See id. at n.132.
173 See id. at 415–16.
174 See SAUSVILLE, supra note 121, at 21–22. R
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lic discomfort with the notion of political pressures as the sole safe-
guard inhibiting military use-of-force on the homefront.
B. Federal Procedural Safeguards
Another commentator proposed a model that involved judicial-
procedural safeguards to permit case-by-case expansion of federal
authority in situations where state governments are unable to protect
citizens’ health, safety, and welfare.175  Based on the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) court structure and operation, the
model would involve “on-call” judges that the President would peti-
tion through the Attorney General for a “warrant” authorizing military
law-enforcement powers after making out a prima facie case that pri-
mary state law enforcement in the affected area has failed.176  The
idea is animated by a view of state authority as an obstacle to military
intervention, and specifically highlights Louisiana Governor Kathleen
Blanco’s insistence on state control over the Hurricane Katrina
response and the resulting delays in federal intervention.177
In terms of protecting civil liberties, the model has appeal.  Court
approved warrants are a long-standing safeguard against government
excess.178  Additionally, the Courts are more isolated from fluctuating
political winds, and are theoretically more likely to preserve civil liber-
ties even in the passions of the moment.179  Delays from the process
may be mitigated by the traditional Presidential authority under the
Insurrection Act and Stafford Acts to uphold federal laws and deliver
humanitarian relief.180  The model specifies such a “warrant” would
only apply to enhanced authority for “general” law enforcement.181
This concept might also provide a valuable safeguard against abuses
under MCCLE laws in routine, day-to-day matters that lend greater
risk to civil liberty infringement.
175 See McGrane, supra note 8, at 1332–39 (2006) (discussing a proposed PCA R
Court to generate “warrants” for federal law enforcement in states that cannot
enforce their own laws).
176 See id. at 1335.
177 See id. at 1326–32.
178 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
179 Federal judges enjoy life tenure and may only be removed from office for
cause. See U.S. CONST. art. III (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.”).
180 See McGrane, supra note 8, at 1335–36 (discussing presidential options to uni- R
laterally invoke the Insurrection Act or seek a “PCA Court” warrant).
181 Id.
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The proposed system, however, is constitutionally questionable
and does not provide clear, coherent criteria to military planners.
Whereas the FISA courts’ jurisdiction extends over requests for sur-
veillance of individuals suspected of foreign intelligence gathering,
the proposed PCA court would control details of a military operation
involving thousands of soldiers and an even greater numbers of civil-
ians.182  There is substantial question if such authority is within the
scope of the “judicial power” vested in the judiciary by the Constitu-
tion.183  Some federal judges balked at the requirements to evaluate
scientific testimony outside of their traditional expertise, and one can
imagine similar discomfort in determining if a state can still provide
equal protection in the contradictory, fast-paced, and confused
reporting typical of a widespread emergency.184  Further, PCA-Court
and Presidential disagreement might result in decision-making break-
downs similar to those between President Bush and Governor Blanco
during the Katrina response, with the Court enjoying insulation from
election-based pressures.185
Military planners would likely share the frustration of political
leaders.  Judicial restrictions might include limitations on the number
of troops used, how they could be used, or the acceptable duration of
a mission.  This could seriously interfere with military determination
of decisive, clearly defined objectives and attainment of sufficient
“mass.”186  Military leaders would have to scrutinize military missions
according to the judicial warrant’s criteria, which are a moving-target
compared to the static terms of the PCA.  Therefore, case-by-case stan-
dards might create even more uncertainty than the vague PCA con-
tours.  These factors would seriously complicate achieving doctrinal
simplicity.  Worse, military commanders would answer to two bosses in
a fractured, non-unified command structure—the President and the
PCA judge.
Exchanging statutorily-imposed frustrations for judicially-
imposed frustrations seems ill-suited to creating a workable system for
182 See id. at 1333–34 (explaining the history of the FISA Courts).
183 See U.S. CONST. art. III.  But see McGrane, supra note 8, at 1334 (highlighting R
how the FISA Courts have survived other constitutional challenges).
184 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing circuit judge discomfort with requirements to evaluate complex testimony
outside their area of expertise).
185 Sean McGrane’s model posits that the President may unilaterally invoke the
PCA even without a warrant.  Though true, the political pressures involved with over-
ruling both a state governor and a federal judge are immense. See McGrane, supra
note 8, at 1335–36. R
186 The Constitution may even require such limitations on issued warrants.
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balancing the civil-liberty, emergency response capability, and doctri-
nal triad.  State-federal controls can enable rather than hinder the bal-
ance of these goals.
V. STATE FOCUSED CONTROL AND FEDERAL MCCLE LIMITATION
A. State-Focused Enhancement of the Insurrection Act
The problematic portion of the repealed Warner Amendments
was not their criteria for domestic military intervention, but rather the
excessive consolidation of power at the President’s sole discretion.
Those same criteria might serve as a guidepost for enhanced authority
in the first section of the Insurrection Act, specifically those based
upon state request or consent.187  As such, the criteria of “insurrec-
tion, domestic violence, natural disaster or other condition” may allow
military intervention with consent of the state executive to perform opera-
tions under that state’s general sovereign powers.  Constitutional justi-
fication for such a modification may be found in either the
Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.188
Presumably, the dueling political safeguards would serve to bal-
ance civil-liberty and military-capability concerns.  Presidential discre-
tion would serve to prevent frivolous federal military use, but would
permit military intervention outside of state jurisdiction or in emer-
gency situations.  State executive discretion would serve to prevent
federal intrusion, preserve civil liberties, and prevent abusive surveil-
lance, searches, and seizures.  This consent-based model does not rely
on preordained statutory criteria or judicial determinations, but
rather the considered judgment of the executives answerable to the
electorate.  The recent response to Hurricane Irene served as a test
case of the principle, using “dual-status” commanders to facilitate
merging National Guard and active duty forces under one responsible
commander.189
187 See 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
188 It is difficult to imagine a widespread catastrophe not disrupting equal protec-
tion of constitutional rights, or not substantially affecting interstate commerce.  The
Insurrection Act already incorporates the Equal Protection clause. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 332; see also Greenberger, supra note 125, at 418–20 (discussing Commerce Clause R
justification for the Warner Amendments).
189 See Staff Sgt. Jim Greenhill, New Capabilities Enhance Guard Response to Hurricane
Irene, U.S. ARMY (Aug. 29, 2011), www.army.mil/article/64452 (describing the multi-
state National Guard response to Hurricane Irene and the use of dual-status com-
manders).  Their roles in this circumstance were limited to relief efforts, but the same
model might support law enforcement roles as well. Id.
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The possibility of collusion between a President and a Governor
to effect undesirable military operations demands a separate safe-
guard.  Congressional power of the purse may also serve as a check on
collusion between the President and state executives.  Congress would
retain the ability to restrain improper or reckless military usage if such
operations were funded only by specific appropriations for the pur-
pose.190  In effect, the purse-strings form a tangible factor requiring
that the military objectives be legitimate.
From an operational standpoint, two options exist for employ-
ment: federal forces may operate under a federal chain-of-command
with consent of the state, or federal forces may operate under the
command of the state executive with Presidential consent.  The inter-
operable191 nature of the military formations allows for state com-
mand of federal force.  Indeed, in recent foreign combat missions
National Guard headquarters commanded active duty units success-
fully.192  A state executive may desire federal command if a situation
degraded the state’s ability to assess and respond properly, or she may
desire a state-controlled response in which command is not a problem
but where force quantity or response time is at issue.193
In this model, federal forces act to directly support state authori-
ties with their consent, much as the California National Guard directly
assisted Los Angeles police in 1992.194  The overall responsibility for
carrying out police powers remains with the state, as the military par-
ticipation depends on their consent.  The President may choose to
assist using this expanded authority, to assist using only traditional
powers, or to not assist at all.
From a military perspective, planning is greatly simplified.
“Defined, decisive, and attainable”195 objectives may be determined
solely by their effectiveness and constitutionality.  Mass is enhanced, as
190 In this concept, Congress authorizes a set, small amount of funds for domestic
military operations.  As operations consume the budget, the Congress must ratify the
President’s action by providing additional funding or may simply allow the funding to
lapse.
191 As illustrated in Part II.A.2, the National Guard and the active duty military
share identical command structures, equipment, and training.  As such, either ele-
ment may successfully command the other.
192 See Lt. Col. Robert Preiss, Texas National Guard Division Takes Charge in Iraq,
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.arng.army.mil/News/Pages/
TexasNationalGuardDivisionTakesChargeinIraq.aspx.
193 Widespread emergencies might adversely affect a Governor’s command of
state forces. See Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was
Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A1.
194 See supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text. R
195 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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state officials are not limited to part-time National Guard forces that
may take too long to assemble.196  Simplicity is easier to achieve, as
proposed actions require only presidential and state consent, rather
than burdensome procedural safeguards far from the flow of informa-
tion.  Further enhancing simplicity, law enforcement functions taken
with state consent would meet the “congressional exception” under
the PCA and would reduce the need to analyze missions case-by-case
for statutory compliance.197  Establishing a unified chain-of-com-
mand, either federal or state, furthers unity of effort and enables the
other principles to flourish.198
This model has drawbacks.  Presidential and state discord was a
primary factor in the delays and frustrations of the federal military
intervention after Hurricane Katrina.199  Such dissent might affect any
safeguard mechanism involving people, but at minimum this model
preserves military authority in its proper spheres.  Dissent may not be
the only danger.  Overeager partnership may invite threats to civil
rights in routine situations that do not warrant military intervention.
Though a congressional funding provision may provide an ultimate
check, military forces might cause catastrophic damage if used
improperly.  As with any model, this one involves compromise to
achieve a proper balance.
B. Federal Limitation of MCCLE
The above revisions to the Insurrection Act may add needed
capability to respond rapidly to a narrow class of rare, emergency situ-
ations that justify the risks of using military units as law enforcement.
It does not address, however, the policy concerns of a sustained mili-
tary presence, domestic military surveillance, or the “militarization” of
civilian law enforcement in counter-drug operations.200  These con-
cerns are more properly addressed in the context of modifying the
MCCLE laws.201  This Note’s central premise in this regard is not
sophisticated—as a routine matter, limit military law enforcement to
rare, emergency situations that justify the attendant risks.  This can be
accomplished by repealing Title 10 provisions that allow loans of per-
sonnel and equipment and those that authorize joint military and law
196 See supra Part I.B.2.
197  See supra part I.B.3.
198 See supra part I.B.4.
199 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. R
200 See supra Part I.A.2–3.
201 These laws specifically charter the military’s counter-drug role. See supra note
144 and accompanying discussion. R
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enforcement training.  Routinely blending the roles, experience has
shown, leads to unacceptable violations of civil rights while detracting
from military readiness.202  To facilitate rare circumstances where mil-
itary assistance is desired, procedural safeguards such as a “PCA
Court”, or an equivalent state institution for National Guard forces,
may be an appropriate governing mechanism.
CONCLUSION
Military interventions are rarely surgical, and there remains sig-
nificant tension between civil rights concerns, societal necessity, and
military needs in the domestic realm.  The current mix of laws gov-
erning domestic military use is over- and under-inclusive.  The combi-
nation of the PCA and the Insurrection Act shackle military options in
emergency situations and can force reliance on part-time forces ill-
suited to rapid response.  In contrast, the MCCLE laws prompt rou-
tine participation in law enforcement actions that invite abuse, erode
liberties, and make little progress toward achieving their missions.
The changes needed to address these deficiencies are not com-
plex.  Congress should ordain broader criteria that allow emergency
intervention with state consent.  MCCLE laws should be curtailed to
allow only information sharing and operations outside state jurisdic-
tion, and the practice of loaning military equipment and personnel to
law enforcement agencies should end.  This series of measures
involves compromise but will result in a better balance of social poli-
cies and allow military planners to accomplish their missions.  More
importantly, it will assist in protecting the United States in times of
emergency without compromising our fundamental principles.
202 See supra Part III.C.
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